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ABSTRACT
Strategies in game theory and multi-agent logics are mathemati-
cal objects of remarkable combinatorial complexity. Recently, the
concept of natural strategies has been proposed to model more
human-like reasoning about simple plans and their outcomes. So
far, the theory of such simple strategic play was only considered in
scenarios where all the agents have perfect information about the
state of the game.
In this paper, we extend the notion of natural strategies to games
with imperfect information. We also show that almost all the com-
plexity results for model checking carry over from the perfect to
imperfect information setting. That is, verification of natural strate-
gies is usually no more complex for agents with uncertainty. This
tells games of natural strategic ability clearly apart from most re-
sults in game theory and multi-agent logics.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Game theory provides a powerful mathematical framework to rea-
son about the interaction of autonomous, purposeful agents. It has
seen numerous applications in robotics, computer science, and AI.
An application domain of particular interest for the multi-agent
systems community concerns formal verification, synthesis, and
planning for reactive and embedded systems. As many relevant
properties of multi-agent systems refer to strategic abilities of agents
and their groups, the need for formal specification and verification
of such properties is essential if we want to make sure that the
systems operate in the way we want them to.
Logics for strategic reasoning. A fundamental contribution in
this field is alternating-time temporal logic ATL and its syntactic
extension ATL∗ [8]. Formulas of ATL are usually interpreted over
concurrent game structures (CGS) which are labeled state-transition
systems that model synchronous interaction among agents. For
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example, in a ticket vending machine, the ATL formula ⟨⟨c⟩⟩Fticket
may be used to express that the customer c can ensure that he will
eventually obtain a ticket, regardless of the actions of the other
agents. The specification holds if c has a strategy whose every
execution path satisfies Fticket. Clearly, it captures an important
functionality requirement for any ticket vending machine. Similarly,
in a bullet voting system, ⟨⟨v, crc⟩⟩G(AFvotedv, i ↔ AFpaidcrc,v)
says that the voter and the coercer have a collective strategy to
ensure that the coercer will pay out the prearranged bribe when-
ever v has voted for the indicated candidate i . This is obviously
an undesirable property for most voting systems, as it allows to
establish a vote buying scheme between the coercer and the voter.
Natural strategies. Following the game-theoretic model of multi-
step play, strategies inMAS are understood as conditional plans, and
play a central role in reasoning about purposeful agents. Formally,
strategies in ATL, as well as in other logics of strategic reasoning
such as Strategy Logic [25, 47, 48], are defined as functions from
sequences of system states (i.e., possible histories of the game) to
actions. A simpler notion of positional a.k.a.memoryless strategies is
formally defined by functions from states to actions. The approach
makes sense from the mathematical point of view, and might be
appropriate to reason about strategic abilities of a computer pro-
gram with extensive computational power at hand. However, it is
completely unrealistic for reasoning about human behavior. This is
because humans are very bad at handling combinatorially complex
objects. A human strategy should be relatively simple and intuitive
(or “natural”) in order for the person to understand it, memorize it,
and execute it. This applies even more if the human agent is to come
up with the strategy on his own. A similar concern can be raised
for of artificial agents with limited memory and/or computational
power, such as simple robots, sensors in an autonomous sensor
network, and components of Internet of Things.
To address this problem, NatATL was introduced in [39]. The
logic updates ATL by replacing the strategic operator ⟨⟨A⟩⟩φ with
a bounded version ⟨⟨A⟩⟩≤kφ, where k ∈ N denotes the complexity
bound. To measure the complexity of strategies, it was assumed that
they are represented by lists of guarded actions. For memoryless
strategies, guards are boolean propositional formulas. For strategies
with recall, guards are given as regular expressions over boolean
propositional formulas.
Natural ability for imperfect information. A crucial issue in
reasoning about MAS is the observational and epistemic limitations
of the agents. The most important distinction is between perfect and
imperfect information scenarios. In the former case, all the players
have always full knowledge of the current state of the game. In the
latter the players may have to make their decisions with limited in-
formation at hand. Both settings have been intensively investigated
in the literature, and applied in real-life domains. A classic approach
to modeling imperfect information is to use indistinguishability
relations over game states [9, 11–16, 18, 22–24, 26, 32, 38, 40, 42, 44–
46, 50, 52]. Then, the agent is supposed to specify the same action
for all indistinguishable states. This in turn has a huge impact on
the related decision problems, such as game solving and model
checking. Indeed, it is well known that solving multi-player games
of imperfect information are computationally hard (non-elementary
or even undecidable) [50, 52].
In this paper, we present a variant of NatATL for agents with
imperfect information. To measure the complexity of strategies,
we assume that they are represented by lists of guarded actions.
For memoryless strategies, guards are epistemic boolean propo-
sitional formulas. For strategies with recall, guards are given as
regular expressions over epistemic boolean propositional formu-
las. As technical results, we study the problem of model checking
NatATL for both memoryless and memoryfull strategies. The com-
plexity ranges from ∆P2 to PSPACE in the general case, and from
P to ∆P2 for small complexity bounds. Thus, verification of natural
strategies is usually no more complex for agents with uncertainty.
This is an interesting result, and one that clearly separates games
of natural strategic ability from most results in game theory and
multi-agent logics.
Outline of the paper. The rest of the paper is organized as follows.
In Sec.2 we introduce natural strategies with uncertainty. In Sec.3
we present NatATL for agents with imperfect information and in
Sec.4 we study the model checking problem under imperfect recall
strategies. In Sec.5 we introduce natural strategies with perfect
recall and in Sec.6 we study the related model checking problem
(under imperfect information). Finally, we conclude in Sec.7.
1.1 Related Work
Imperfect information games have been largely considered in the
literature [21, 29, 36, 43, 52]. A seminal work is [52] in which a num-
ber of variants of 2-player games with imperfect information have
been investigated. Generally, having imperfect information imme-
diately reflects on worsening the complexity of solving the game.
In multi-player games one can easily jump to non-elementary [50]
or even to undecidability [29]. As an evidence we mention [51]
where a pipeline of processes architecture is considered and each
output communication of process i is taken as the input communi-
cation of process i + 1. The reachability problem under imperfect
information in this specific setting is decidable but complete for
non-elementary time1.
In many cases, solving the related decision problem for ATL∗ be-
comes undecidable [8, 29]. In particular it is undecidable in the case
of three agents having perfect recall of the past, while it is elemen-
tary decidable in case the agents play positional (a.k.a. memoryless)
strategies.
ATL∗ has been the subject of intensive research within multi-
agent systems andAI.Works that are closest in spirit to our proposal
concern modeling, specification, and reasoning about strategies of
bounded agents. [3] investigates strategic properties of agents with
bounded memory, while [11] considers bounded memory as an
1Other settings have been also taken in consideration and leading to an undecidable
problem.
approximation of perfect recall. [6, 7, 19, 20] extend temporal and
strategic logics to handle agents with bounded resources. Issues
related to bounded rationality are also investigated in [10, 31, 35].
The papers that studied explicit representation of strategies are
also relevant. This category is much richer and includes extensions
of ATL∗ with explicit reasoning about actions and strategies [1, 34,
54, 56], and logics that combine features of temporal and dynamic
logic [33, 49]. A variant of STIT logic, that enables reasoning about
strategies and their performance in the object language, can be
found in [30]. Also, plans in agent-oriented programming are in
fact rule-based descriptions of strategies. In particular, reasoning
about agent programs using strategic logics was investigated in [4,
5, 17, 28, 57].
2 NATURAL STRATEGIES UNDER
UNCERTAINTY
We begin by showing that the notion of natural strategies, intro-
duced in [39], can be adapted to imperfect information scenarios
in a very simple way.
2.1 Models of Multi-Agent Interaction
The semantics of NatATL is defined over concurrent game struc-
tures with imperfect information, a variant of synchronous multi-
agent transition systems.
Definition 2.1 (iCGS). A concurrent game structure with imper-
fect information (iCGS for short) is a tuple M = ⟨Agt, St ,Act ,d, t ,
Prop,V , {∼i }i ∈Agt⟩ which includes:
• nonempty finite set of agents (or players)Agt= {a1,. . .,a |Agt |},
• nonempty finite set of states St ,
• nonempty finite set of actions Act ,
• nonempty finite set of atomic propositions Prop,
• propositional valuation V : St → 2Prop ,
• for every ai ∈ Agt, ∼i is a relation of indistinguishability
between states, that is, given two states s, s ′ ∈ St , s ∼i s ′ iff
s and s ′ are indistinguishable for agent ai ,
• the function d : Agt × St → 2Act defines availability of
actions,
• the (deterministic) transition function t assigns a successor
state q′ = t(q,α1, . . . ,α |Agt |) to each state q ∈ St and any
tuple of actions αi ∈d(ai ,q) that can be executed by Agt in q.
In the rest of the paper, we will write da (q) instead of d(a,q),
and we will denote the set of collective choices of group A in state
q by dA(q) =∏ai ∈A dai (q). Moreover, we require that the iCGS is
uniform, i.e., q ∼i q′ implies di (q) = di (q′).
A pointed iCGS is a pair (M,q0) whereM is a concurrent game
structure and q0 a state inM .
A path λ = q0q1q2 . . . in an iCGS is an infinite sequence of states
such that there is a transition between each qi ,qi+1. λ[i] denotes
the ith position on λ (starting from i = 0), λ[i, j] the part of λ
between positions i and j , and λ[i,∞] the suffix of λ starting with i .
ByΛM ⊆ Stω , we denote the set of all the paths inM , and byΛM (q)
all the paths inM starting in q. Similarly, a history h = q0q1q2 . . .qn
is a finite sequence of states that can be effected by subsequent
transitions. By last(h) = qn we denote the last element of the
sequence. We denote by HM ⊆ St+ the set of all the histories in
modelM . We will omit the subscripts whenever they are clear from
the context.
Example 2.2 (Logistic Robots). Two robots (agents 1 and 2), serve
a machine that produces electronic units for car control systems
(agent 3). The machine has two output belts, marked A and B. The
task of the robots is to pick up the units from the belts, so that
they can be later delivered to the assembly room. The initial state,
labeled by the atomic proposition init, corresponds to the situation
when both robots serve the first belt (qAA). At each moment, the
robots can stay where they are (action st ) or move to the other belt
(actionmv). At the same time, the machine can send a unit to one
of the belts (actionsA and B) or stay idle (action i). If the belt where
the unit arrives is not served by any of the robots, the unit falls
down and gets damaged. This is modeled by a system transition to
the “failure” state qf , labeled by proposition damage.
Robot 1 can recognize its own position, but does not see the
other robot. Moreover, robot 2 can see if it is by the same belt as
the other robot, but has no sensor to identify the exact position.
The observational capabilities of the machine are irrelevant.
An iCGSMrobots for the scenario is depicted in Figure 1. States,
transitions (represented by solid arrows), indistinguishability rela-
tions (represented by dotted lines), and valuation of atomic propo-
sitions can be easily derived from the picture.
2.2 Simple Strategies for Uncertain Agents
We start by defining the notion of uniform natural memoryless
strategy (or nir-strategy2) sa for agent a. The idea is to use a rule-
based representation, with a list of condition-action rules. The first
rule whose condition holds in the current state is selected, and the
corresponding action is executed.
Formally, we define the set of epistemic conditions EP for the
agent a as follows:
ψ ::= ⊤ | Kaφ | ¬ψ | ψ ∧ψ
φ ::= p | ¬φ | φ ∧ φ | Kbφ
where p is an atomic proposition and b an agent.
So, we are talking about formulas that are prefixed by Ka and
then possibly combined by Boolean operators. In other words, for-
mulasψ are always Boolean conditions on a’s knowledge.
Given an iCGSM , a stateq ∈ St , and an epistemic conditionφ, we
inductively define whether q satisfies φ (q |= φ) and consequently
as follows:
q |= p iff p ∈ V (q);
q |= ¬φ iff q |= φ does not hold;
q |= φ1 ∧ φ2 iff q |= φ1 and q |= φ2;
q |= Kaφ iff for all q′ ∼a q, it holds that q′ |= φ;
We represent uniform natural strategies by lists of guarded ac-
tions, i.e., sequences of n pairs (φi , αi ) such that: (1) φi is an epis-
temic condition, and (2) αi ∈ da (q) for every q ∈ St such that
q |= φi . That is, φi is an epistemic condition on states of the iCGS,
and αi is an action available to agent a in every state where φi
holds. Moreover, we assume that the last pair on the list is (⊤, α),
with α ∈ dAд(q), for all q ∈ St and some α ∈ Act , i.e., the last rule
is guarded by a condition that will always be satisfied and contains
an action that is executable in every state.
2As usual in literature, we use i for imperfect information and r for imperfect recall
(memoryless). Additionally, we use n for natural strategies, thus the acronym.
The set of all uniform natural memoryless strategies of agent a
is denoted by Σnira . By size(sa ) we denote the number of guarded
actions in sa . Moreover, condi (sa ) will denote the ith guard (con-
dition) on the list, and acti (sa ) the corresponding action. Finally,
match(q, sa ) is the smallest i ≤ size(sa ) such that q |= condi (sa )
and acti (sa ) ∈ da (q). That is,match(q, sa ) matches state q with the
first condition in sa that holds in q, and action available in q.
It is easy to see that the strategies are uniform in the sense
of [41, 53], i.e., they specify the same actions in indistinguishable
states.
Proposition 2.3. Given a uniform natural memoryless strategy sa
and two states such that q ∼a q′, we have that actmatch(q,sa )(sa ) =
actmatch(q′,sa )(sa ).
Proof. Take sa =
((φ1,α1), . . . , (φn ,αn )) and any pair of states
q,q′ such that q ∼a q′. Letmatch(q, sa ) = i . That is, φi holds in q,
but every φ j for j < i does not. Since all of φi ,φ j are either equal to
⊤ or begin with Ka , they must either hold in both q,q′, or in none
of them. Thus, we get thatmatch(q′, sa ) = i , too. □
A collective uniform natural strategy for a group of agents A =
{a1, . . . ,a |A |} is a tuple of individual uniform natural strategies
sA = (sa1 , . . . , sa |A| ). The set of such strategies is denoted by ΣnirA .
The “outcome” function out(q, sA) returns the set of all paths that
occur when agents A execute strategy sA from state q onward.
Formally, given a state q ∈ St , a subset of agents A and a collective
uniform memoryless strategy sA, we define:
out(q, sA) = {λ ∈ Λ | (λ[0] = q) ∧ ∀i≥0∃α1, ...,α |Agt| .
(a ∈ A⇒ αa = actmatch(λ[i],sa )(sa )) ∧
(a < A⇒ αa ∈ da (λ[i])) ∧ (λ[i + 1] = t(λ[i],α1,...,α |Agt |))}.
Example 2.4 (Logistic Robots, ctd.). The following collective nat-
ural strategy can be used by the robots to ensure that the goods
never get damaged in the iCGS of Example 2.2:
s1 :
( (⊤, st) ) ;
s2 :
( (¬K2¬init, mv),
(⊤, st) ) .
By looking at Figure 2.2 it is evident that s1 will force robot 1
to always perform action st , and robot 2 to play actionmv only in
qAA and qBB (where he does not know whether init holds or not)
and st elsewhere.
2.3 How to Measure Natural Strategies
By compl (sa ), we denote the complexity of the strategy sa . Intu-
itively, the complexity of a strategy is understood as the level of
sophistication of its representation. Several natural metrics can be
used to measure the complexity of a strategy, given its representa-
tion from (EP(Prop) ×Act)+, e.g.:
Used vocabulary: compl#(sa ) = |dom(sa )| where dom(sa ) is the
set of atomic propositions and epistemic operators used in
the conditions of sa ;
Largest condition: complmax(sa ) = max{|φ | | (φ,α) ∈ sa };
Total size of the representation: complΣ(sa ) =
∑
(φ,α )∈sa |φ |
with |φ | being the number of symbols in φ, without parentheses.
From now on, we will focus on the last metric for complexity of
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Figure 1: Logistic robots serving the output of a machine. The wildcard (∗) matches any action of the respective agent
strategies, which takes into account the total size of all the condi-
tions used in the representation. That is, unless explicitly specified,
we will assume compl (sa ) = complΣ(sa ).
For a collective uniform natural strategy sA, we define its com-
plexity as the total complexity of the individual strategies in sA.
Formally, given sA = (sa1 , . . . , sa |A| ), we have that compl (sA) =∑
1≤i≤ |A | compl (sai ).
Example 2.5 (Logistic Robots, ctd.). For the natural strategy s {1,2}
in Example 2.4, we get compl (s {1,2}) = 6. Note that an even sparser
representation of the same plan can be obtained by replacing robot
2’s strategy with:
s ′2 :
( (K2¬init, st),
(⊤, mv) ),
which reduces the complexity of the joint strategy to 5.
3 REASONING ABOUT NATURAL ABILITY
Now we can propose a logic for reasoning about natural strate-
gic ability under imperfect information. To achieve that, we use
exactly the same syntax as for natural strategies with perfect in-
formation [39]. The semantics updates the one from [39] with the
requirement that only uniform natural strategies are allowed.
3.1 A Logic for Natural Strategies
Natural ATL (NatATL, for short) is obtained by replacing in ATL
the modality ⟨⟨A⟩⟩ with the bounded strategic modality ⟨⟨A⟩⟩≤k .
Intuitively, ⟨⟨A⟩⟩≤kγ reads as “coalition A has a collective uniform
strategy of size less or equal than k to enforce the property γ .” As
in ATL, the formulas of NatATL make use of classical temporal
operators: X (“in the next state”), U (strong “until”), and W (weak
“until”). Thus, the language of NatATL can be defined by the fol-
lowing grammar:
φ ::= p | ¬φ |φ ∧ φ | ⟨⟨A⟩⟩≤kX φ | ⟨⟨A⟩⟩≤kφ U φ | ⟨⟨A⟩⟩≤kφW φ.
where p ∈ Prop, A ⊆ Agt, and k ∈ N, given in a unary encoding.
Additionally, operators F (“now or sometime in the future”) and
G (“always from now on”) are defined as follows: Fφ ≡ ⊤U φ,
Gφ ≡ φW ⊥.
We will use 1NatATL to denote the fragment of NatATL that
admits only formulas consisting of a single strategic modality, fol-
lowed by a temporal formula over boolean connectives and atomic
propositions. It would be interesting to consider the broader speci-
fication language of NatATL∗, and extend our results accordingly.
We leave this angle for future work.
3.2 Semantics of NatATL under Imperfect
Information
Given an iCGS M , a state q ∈ St , a path λ ∈ Λ, and k ∈ N, the
semantics of NatATL is defined as follows:
M,q |=nir p iff p ∈ V (q), for p ∈ Prop;
M,q |=nir ¬φ iffM,q |=nir φ does not hold;
M,q |=nir φ1 ∧ φ2 iffM,q |=nir φ1 andM,q |=nir φ2;
M,q |=nir ⟨⟨A⟩⟩≤kX φ iff there is a uniform natural strategy
sA ∈ ΣnrA such that compl (sA) ≤ k and, for each path λ ∈
out(q, sA), we haveM, λ[1] |=nir φ;
M,q |=nir ⟨⟨A⟩⟩≤kφ Uψ iff there is a uniform natural strategy
sA ∈ ΣnirA such that compl (sA) ≤ k and, for each path
λ ∈ out(q, sA), we have M, λ[i] |=nir ψ for some i ≥ 0 and
M, λ[j] |=nir φ for all 0 ≤ j < i .
M,q |=nir ⟨⟨A⟩⟩≤kφWψ iff there is a uniform natural strategy
sA ∈ ΣnirA such that compl (sA) ≤ k and, for each path λ ∈
out(q, sA), we have either thatM, λ[i] |=nir ψ for some i ≥ 0
and M, λ[j] |=nir φ for all 0 ≤ j < i , or that M, λ[i] |=nir φ
for all i ≥ 0.
We will refer to the logical system (NatATL, |=nir) as NatATLir,
and analogously for 1NatATLir.
Example 3.1 (Logistic Robots, ctd.). Following Example 2.5, we
getMrobots,qAA |= ⟨⟨1, 2⟩⟩≤5G¬damage. It is also easy to see that no
simpler strategyworks. Thus,Mrobots,qAA |= ¬⟨⟨1, 2⟩⟩≤4G¬damage.
Remark 1 (Objective vs. subjective semantics of ability).
We note that the above semantics encodes the “objective” notion of
strategic ability. That is, ⟨⟨A⟩⟩γ holds in q if the agents have a joint
strategy to enforce γ from q. The alternative is to require the existence
of a strategy that succeeds from all the states that are indistinguishable
fromq forA (the “subjective” semantics). We refer the interested reader
to [2] for an in-depth discussion.
The subjective semantics of NatATLir can be obtained by a simple
modification of the semantic clauses for ⟨⟨A⟩⟩≤k . We also note that
the model checking results, presented in the subsequent sections, can
be adapted to the subjective case in a straightforward way.
4 MODEL CHECKING FOR NATATL
In this section we study algorithms and the complexity of the model
checking problem for NatATL with nir-strategies, i.e. NatATLir.
We consider two cases: one in which the bound k on the size of
natural strategies is assumed to be constant, and the more general
case where k is variable and a parameter of the problem. For the
former case, we prove that the problem is polynomial in the size
of the model. For the latter, model checking becomes ∆P2 -complete.
Moreover, it is NP-complete for simple formulas with only one
strategic operator, i.e., formulas of 1NatATLir.
The results and the proofs proposed in this section have been
inspired by [37, 39, 53].
4.1 Model Checking for Small Natural
Strategies
We begin by looking at NatATLir model checking under the assump-
tion that the complexity bounds k used in formulas are constant
or bounded. In other words, they are not a parameter of the model
checking problem. Under this restriction, one can show a polyno-
mial reduction to the model checking problem for CTL formulas.
Thus, we obtain the following result.
Theorem 4.1. The model checking problem for NatATLir with
fixed k is in P with respect to the size of the model and the length of
the formula.
Proof. First, consider the formula φ = ⟨⟨A⟩⟩≤kγ , in which A ⊆
Agt and γ is a formula over boolean connectives and atomic propo-
sitions. By assumption, the collective strategy that we can assign
to coalition A, namely sA, is bounded and precisely it holds that
complΣ(sA) ≤ k . Recall that epistemic boolean formulas are com-
binations of atomic propositions from the set Prop, boolean con-
nectives from Bool , and the epistemic operators Kn. Thus, there
are O((|Prop | + |Bool | + |Kn |)k · |Act |) possible guarded actions of
length at most k , and henceO(((|Prop |+ |Bool |+ |Kn |)k · |Act |)k ) =
O((|Prop | + |Bool | + |Kn |)k2 (|Act |)k ) possible strategies, which is
ensured to be finite as k is fixed. Note that the strategies are uni-
form by construction, cf. Proposition 2.3. The idea is to check the
available collective strategies one by one, in an arbitrary order.
Given a collective strategy sA, we can prune the CGS by re-
moving all the edges that disagree with sA. This operation costs
O(|t |) in the worst case, where t is the transition relation of the
input iCGS . So far we have dealt with the strategic operator in
the input formula φ, and we are left with a structure S that can
be seen as a Kripke structure. Now, we can reduce our problem
to model checking the CTL formula Aγ (“for all paths γ ”) over
S by using the standard model checking algorithm for CTL [27],
well-known to have complexity O(|t | · |γ |). The total complexity
is thus O((|Prop | + |Bool | + |Kn |)k2 (|Act |)k ·O(|A| ·max({| ∼a | |
a ∈ A})) · (|t | + (|t | · |γ |))) = O((|Prop | + |Bool | + |Kn |)k2 (|Act |)k ·
O(|A| ·max({| ∼a | | a ∈ A})) · |t | · |γ |), and hence polynomial in
the size of the model and the length of the formula.
To conclude the proof, note that if we have a formula with more
strategic operators then we can use a classic bottom-up procedure.
I.e., we start by solving the innermost subformula with a strategic
operator (as we have done above) and, once this is solved, we
update the formula and the structure, and continue with the new
innermost subformula. The procedure ends when we have dealt
with the outermost strategic operator in the input formula. □
4.2 Model Checking: General Case
We now study the complexity for NatATLir with the bounds in
strategic modalities given as variables.
Theorem 4.2. Model checking 1NatATLir is NP-complete with
respect to the size of the model, the length of the formula, and the
maximal bound k in the formula.
Proof. For the lower bound, we recall that 1NatATLIr is NP-
hard [39]. For the upper bound, consider φ = ⟨⟨A⟩⟩≤kγ , in which
A ⊆ Agt and γ is a formula over boolean connectives and atomic
propositions. We cannot anymore enumerate all the suitable strate-
gies and check them one by one. To overcome this, we nondeter-
ministically guess a uniform collective strategy sA, and proceed
using the same reasoning as in the proof of Theorem 4.1. Since the
size of sA is polynomial in the size of the model, the complexity of
the algorithm is NP. □
To establish the model checking complexity for all formulas of
NatATLir, we adapt the above proofs in a way similar to [37, 39].
Theorem 4.3. Model checking NatATLir is ∆P2 -complete with re-
spect to the size of the model, the length of the formula, and the
maximal bound k in the formula.3
3 ∆P2 = P
NP is the class of problems solvable in polynomial time by a deterministic
Turing machine making adaptive calls to an oracle for problems in NP.
Proof. For the lower bound, we recall that NatATLIr is ∆P2 -hard
[39]. For the upper bound, we make use of a bottom-up procedure
based on the one introduced in the proof of Theorem 4.1. Precisely,
take an arbitrary formula φ of NatATLir and consider its inner
part that is of the kindψ = ⟨⟨A⟩⟩≤kγ , with γ being a formula over
boolean connectives and atomic propositions. Now, apply overψ the
procedure used in the proof of Theorem 4.2 that we know to be NP.
Onceψ is solved, use the same NP procedure to solveψ ′, a formula
that containsψ and a strategic operator, and so on for each strategic
operator in φ. This means that we use an oracle over a polynomial
procedure for each strategic operator in φ. Summing up, the total
complexity to solve a formula in NatATLir is PNP = ∆P2 . □
5 NATURAL ABILITIES OF AGENTS WITH
MEMORY
Agents with memory can base their decisions on the history of the
game, i.e., the sequence of states that has occurred so far. How can
we represent conditions on such sequences? One possibility is to
use states in some kind of automaton [55]. Here, we suggest that it
is more intuitive for humans to represent conditions on histories
by regular expressions over epistemic propositional formulas.
5.1 Natural Strategies with Recall
Let Reд(L) be the set of regular expressions over the language L
(with the standard constructors ·,∪, ∗ representing concatenation,
nondeterministic choice, and finite iteration). A uniform natural
strategy with recall (or niR-strategy) sa for agent a is a sequence of
appropriate pairs from Reд(EP(Prop)) ×Act . That is, it consists of
pairs (r , α) where r is a regular expression over EP(Prop), and α is
an action available in last(h), i.e. α ∈ da (last(h)), for all histories
h ∈ H consistent with r . Formally, given a regular expression r and
the language L(r ) on words generated by r , a historyh = q0 . . .qn is
consistent with r iff ∃b ∈ L(r ) such that |h | = |b | and ∀0≤i≤nh[i] |=
b[i]. Similarly to nir-strategies, the last pair on the list is assumed
to be simply (⊤∗, idle). The set of such strategies is denoted by
ΣniRa . Finally,match(λ[0, i], sa ) is the smallest n ≤ size(sa ) such that
∀0≤j≤iλ[j] |= condn (sa )[j] and actn (sa ) ∈ da (λ[i]).
Again, we observe that the strategies are uniform in the sense
of [41, 53], i.e., they specify the same actions in indistinguishable
sequences of states.
Proposition 5.1. Given a uniform natural strategy with recall sa
and two histories h,h′ such that |h | = |h′ | and ∀i . h[i] ∼a h′[i], we
have that actmatch(h,sa )(sa ) = actmatch(h′,sa )(sa ).
Proof. The result follows directly by considering the proof
given in Prop.2.3. In particular, take sa =
((φ1,α1), . . . , (φn ,αn ))
and any pair of histories h,h′ such that |h | = |h′ | and ∀i ≤ |h |,
h[i] ∼a h′[i]. Letmatch(h, sa ) =m. That is, ∀i ≤ |h |, φm [i] holds in
h[i], but every φ j [i] for j < m does not. Since all of φm [i],φ j [i] are
either equal to ⊤ or begin with Ka , they must either hold in both
h[i],h′[i], or in none of them. Thus, we get thatmatch(h′, sa ) =m,
too. □
A collective uniform natural strategy for a group of agents A =
{a1, . . . ,a |A |} is a tuple of individual uniform natural strategies
sA = (sa1 , . . . , sa |A| ). The set of such strategies is denoted by ΣniRA .
Figure 2: A maze with no loops
Again, out(q, sA) returns the set of all paths from q, consistent
with strategy sA. For strategies with recall, we simply replace
“match(λ[i], sa )” with “match(λ[0, i], sa )” in the definition of out(q,
sA) that we gave in Section 2.2 for memoryless strategies.
The metrics from Section 2.2 extend to strategies with recall
and collective strategies with recall in the straightforward way.
Additionally, we define a variant of the metric complΣ(·) that skips
the initial ⊤∗ whenever it appears in a regular expression:
Size of the significant pattern: complΣ∗ (sa ) =
∑
(r,α )∈sa | |r | |,
with | |⊤∗ | | = 1, | |⊤∗ · r | | = |r |, and | |r | | = |r | otherwise.
The latter is the size of a regular expression that is, as usual,
the number of symbols it contains, including the syntactic
symbols such as brackets, +, ·, and ∗.4
From now on, we will focus on the last metric for the complexity
of strategies with recall. That is, unless explicitly specified, we will
assume compl (sa ) = complΣ∗ (sa ).
Example 5.2 (Foggy maze). Consider agent r (“the rover”) whose
goal is to get through a maze, such as the one in Figure 2. We
assume that the maze is perfect, i.e., it has no loops. Moreover, it is
inhabited by a number of other, hostile agents. Each agent can, at
any moment, decide to turn left (action turnL), turn right (action
turnR ), move forward (step) or do nothing (wait ). Moving succeeds
if there is neither a wall nor another agent in front. Agent r can
also execute action destroy that annihilates the agent standing in
front of him, if there is one. The maze is sometimes overtaken by
fog, in which case the agents see nothing for 1 or 2 moments.
Assume an iCGSMmaze modeling the scenario as follows. The
states register the positions and the orientation of all the agents.
Two states are indistinguishable to an agent i iff they agree on the
position and the orientation of i , and:
• either in both states the maze is foggy,
• or in both states the fog is absent, and they agree on the
content of the cell in front of i .
4Sometimes we will also use as an abbreviation (r )i to denote the concatenation of r
i-times. In this case the size of |(r )i | = i |r | + (i − 1).
The atomic propositions start and finish label the states where the
rover is respectively at the maze entry and exit. Propositions wall
and creature label the states where the rover faces respectively a
wall or another agent.
The following natural strategy with recall guarantees that the
rover gets through the maze (we use ψfog as a shorthand for
¬Kr creature ∧ ¬Kr¬creature to simplify the notation):
sr :
( (⊤∗ ·ψfog, wait),
(⊤∗ · Kr creature, destroy),
(⊤∗ · Kr¬wall, step),
(⊤∗ · ¬Krwall ·ψfog∗ · Krwall, turnL),
(⊤∗ · ¬Krwall · (ψfog∗ · Krwall)2, turnR ),
(⊤∗ · ¬Krwall · (ψfog∗ · Krwall)3, turnR ),
(⊤∗, turnR ) ).
That is, if the fog is in the maze, the rover waits until it clears; if
he sees an enemy, he destroys it. If he faces a wall, he tries first to
turn left; if there is a wall as well, he keeps turning right until he
finds a passage.
The complexity of the strategy is compl (sr ) = {8 + 2 + 3 + 16 +
29+ 42+ 1} = 101. Note also that, if we add to the model an atomic
proposition fog that labels all the “foggy” states, we can use it
instead ofψfog to specify the same behavior. This would reduce the
complexity of the strategy to compl (s ′r ) = {1+2+3+9+15+21} = 51.
Finally, we observe that the strategy may result in a very inef-
fective traversal of the maze, i.e., the number of steps between the
start and the exit can be large. Still, the natural strategy above has
two important advantages. First, it is much simpler – and therefore
much easier to store and use – than the combinatorial strategy that
specifies the right choice for every position of the rover. Secondly,
it is general in the sense that it does not depend on the actual shape
of the labyrinth.
5.2 NatATL for Strategies with Recall
Now it is easy to define the semantics of natural strategic ability
for agents with recall. Formally, we construct the semantic relation
|=niR by replacing “|=nir” with “|=niR” and ΣnirA with ΣniRA in the
clauses from Section 3.2, so that the clauses for strategic modalities
become as follows:
M,q |=niR ⟨⟨A⟩⟩≤kX φ iff there is a uniform natural strategy
sA ∈ ΣniRA such that compl (sA) ≤ k and, for each path λ ∈
out(q, sA), we haveM, λ[1] |=niR φ;
M,q |=niR ⟨⟨A⟩⟩≤kφ Uψ iff there is a uniform natural strategy
sA ∈ ΣniRA such that compl (sA) ≤ k and, for each path
λ ∈ out(q, sA), we have M, λ[i] |=niR ψ for some i ≥ 0 and
M, λ[j] |=niR φ for all 0 ≤ j < i .
M,q |=niR ⟨⟨A⟩⟩≤kφWψ iff there is a uniform natural strategy
sA ∈ ΣniRA such that compl (sA) ≤ k and, for each path λ ∈
out(q, sA), we have either thatM, λ[i] |=niR ψ for some i ≥ 0
and M, λ[j] |=niR φ for all 0 ≤ j < i , or that M, λ[i] |=niR φ
for all i ≥ 0.
We will refer to the logical system (NatATL, |=niR) as NatATLiR.
Example 5.3 (Foggy maze, ctd.). For the maze model in Exam-
ple 5.2, we have e.g. thatMmaze,qstart |= ⟨⟨r ⟩⟩≤93Ffinish.
Algorithm mCheckconstNatATLiR (M,q, ⟨⟨A⟩⟩≤kγ ) :
1 for every sA with compl (sA) ≤ k do
2 i f not I sLosinд(sA, M, q, p1 U p2) then return ( t r u e ) ;
3 return ( f a l s e ) ;
Figure 3: Model checking NatATLiR for simple goals, i.e.,
γ ≡ p1 U p2 or γ ≡ p1Wp2. The value of k is bounded by a
constant
6 MODEL CHECKING FOR NATURAL
STRATEGIES WITH RECALL
In this section we investigate the model checking problem for
NatATL with niR-strategies, i.e., NatATLiR. We consider the cases
of both constant and variable bounds on strategies. We begin with
the following lemma.
Lemma 6.1. Given an iCGS M , a uniform natural strategy with
recall sA = (sa1 , . . . , san ) ∈ ΣniRA of size k = compl (sA), and a
reachability objective γ ≡ p1 U p2. In order to check if sA enforces γ
from q ∈ StM , it suffices to consider the prefixes of length |StM | · 22k2
of paths in out(q, sA). The same applies to safety objectives (p1W p2).
Proof. Consider the tree of paths inM , starting from q and con-
sistent with sA. It can be obtained by an (infinite) process, based on
the following notion of configuration: C = (qM ,qr eд1 , . . . ,qr eдn )
where qM is the current state ofM , and every qr eдi is the current
state of a deterministic finite automaton (DFA) accepting the ith
regular expression in sA. The initial configuration C0 consists of q
and the initial states of the DFA’s.
Let C be the current configuration. The process takes, for each
agent a ∈ A, the first DFA for a regular expression in sa that is
currently in an accepting state, and selects the corresponding action
in sa for execution by a. Then, for every possible tuple of responses
from Agt \A, a transition is added, leading to the configuration C ′
consisting of the successor state q′ inM and the states of the DFA’s
updated accordingly. Note that, whenever the process revisits a
previously encountered configuration, exactly the same transitions
as before are added. Thus, whatever reachability objective can be
validated (resp. safety objective invalidated), it can be done on the
initial, cycle-free segment of the tree.
Finally, observe that sA contains at most k regular expressions,
and each expression is of length at most k . For every regular expres-
sion of length ℓ, there exists an equivalent nondeterministic finite
automaton (NFA) with at most 2ℓ states (Thompson’s construction).
Finally, for every NFA with n states, there exists an equivalent DFA
with at most 2n states (powerset construction). Thus, the number
of configurations is at most |StM | · (22k )k = |StM | · 22k2 . □
6.1 Model Checking for Small Strategies
When the bound on strategies is fixed or bounded by some constant
K, model checking can again proceed by checking the available
strategies one by one. The algorithm for formulas with no nested
strategic modalities is shown in Figure 3.
Note that the verification of strategies is somewhat more in-
volved than in the memoryless case. To this end, we use an oracle
Algorithm IsLosinд(sA,M,q, p1 U p2) :
1 count := 0 ; state := q ;
2 size := compl (sA) ; l imit := 22·size2 ;
3 for every r e g u l a r e x p r e s s i o n ri ∈ sA do
4 i n i t i a l i z e the NFA Ai for ri ;
5 repeat
6 i f M, state |= p2 then return ( f a l s e ) ;
7 i f M, state ̸ |= p1 then return ( t r u e ) ;
8 for each a ∈ A do
9 match := minimal i such t h a t ri ∈ sa
10 and Ai i s in an a c c e p t i n g s t a t e ;
11 αa := actmatch (sa ) ;
12 for each a < A do
13 n o n d e t e rm i n i s t i c a l l y choose αa ∈ d (a, state) ;
14 state := t (state, α1, . . . , α |Agt|) ;
15 for every NFA Ai do
16 n o n d e t e rm i n i s t i c a l l y update the s t a t e o f Ai ;
17 count := count + 1 ;
18 until count > l imit ;
19 return ( t r u e ) ;
Figure 4: Oracle that tries to invalidate strategy sA for a sim-
ple reachability goal p1 U p2
Algorithm mCheckNatATLiR (M,q, ⟨⟨A⟩⟩≤kγ ) :
1 gues s a s t r a t e g y sA ∈ ΣniRA with compl (sA) ≤ k ;
2 return ( not I sLosinд(sA, M, q, p1 U p2) ) ;
Figure 5: Model checking NatATLiR for simple goals; k is a
parameter of the problem
IsLosinд that returns “true” if it manages to guess a path invalidat-
ing the goal γ , and “false” otherwise. The case of simple reachability
goals is presented in Figure 4; for simple safety goals, the oracle is
defined analogously. It proceeds by nondeterministically unfolding
a path consistent with strategy sA from state q on until it either
fulfills the goal, invalidates it, or exceeds the limit determined in
Lemma 6.1. Notice that the oracle uses NFA implementations of the
regular expressions in sA, and not the DFA’s that were employed in
the proof of Lemma 6.1.
The complexity of the procedure is as follows. The oracle runs in
O(22K2 ) +O(K) +O(|StM | · 22K2 · (K|Agt| + |t | + |St |)) steps. Since
K is a constant, this reduces to O(|StM | · (|Agt| + |t | + |St |)). Thus,
the oracle runs in nondeterministic polynomial time with respect
to the size of the model. In consequence, the algorithm in Figure 3
runs in time PNP = ∆P2 .
For nested strategic modalities, we proceed recursively, bottom-
up, which yields the complexity of P∆P2 = ∆P2 for the whole problem.
Theorem 6.2. Model checking forNatATLiR with fixed or bounded
k is in ∆P2 w.r.t. the size of the model and the length of the formula.
6.2 Model Checking: General Case
We now study the model checking complexity for NatATLiR in case
the bound on strategies is a parameter of the problem. For variable
k , the algorithm in Figures 3 and 4 clearly runs in exponential time.
It may also use an exponential amount of memory if we are not
careful with how the space of strategies is explored. To avoid this,
we slightly change the main procedure, see Figure 5.
The algorithm still runs in exponential time. Observe, however,
that the oracle uses only polynomial space: the NFA’s have at most
2k states altogether, and, by using binary representations of vari-
ables count and limit , we need at most log2(22k
2 ) = 2k2 memory
cells for each of them. Thus, the complexity of the algorithm in
Figure 5 is NPNPSPACE = NPPSPACE = PSPACE.
For nested strategic modalities, we again proceed recursively,
which results in the PPSPACE = PSPACE complexity for the whole
problem.
Theorem 6.3. Model checking NatATLiR is in PSPACE with re-
spect to the size of the model, the length of the formula, and the
maximal bound k in the formula.
7 CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we extend the alternative take on strategic reason-
ing, proposed in [39], that allows to reason about agents who can
handle only relatively simple strategies. We show how to adapt the
approach to the important (and nontrivial) case of imperfect infor-
mation. To this end, we use a natural representation of strategies by
lists of actions guarded by epistemic conditions, and assume that
only strategies up to size k can be used. We show that such strate-
gies are always executable. Furthermore, we formalize reasoning
about the corresponding strategic play through two new variants of
alternating-time temporal logic: NatATLir and NatATLiR. We argue
that, similarly to perfect information games, this may be a more
accurate view of ability than the one which admits any function
from sequences of states to actions.
In terms of technical results, we concentrate on model checking
for natural strategies under imperfect information. We show that,
for memoryless agents, the problem is in P when k is fixed, and
∆P2 -complete when k is among the input parameters. Thus, synthe-
sis and verification of natural memoryless strategies in the context
of imperfect information is no more difficult than for perfect in-
formation. For agents with recall, the problem is in ∆P2 when k is
fixed, and in PSPACE in the general case, which is still close to the
complexity results obtained in [39]. Thus, we ultimately identify
a natural subclass of model checking for imperfect information
strategies, where the verification is distinctly cheaper than in the
general case.
This is certainly good news, and may prove beneficial in prac-
tical algorithms. Still, we emphasize that the main motivation for
this work is conceptual rather than technical. We believe that the
⟨⟨A⟩⟩≤k operator captures an intuitive concept of strategic ability,
and one that is useful in modeling of and reasoning about multi-
agent interaction.
Acknowledgements.We thank the anonymous reviewers for their
comments and suggestions. Wojciech Jamroga acknowledges the
support of the National Centre for Research and Development
(NCBR), Poland, under the PolLux project VoteVerif (POLLUX-
IV/1/2016). Aniello Murano acknowledges the support from the
Italian GNCS 2018 project "Metodi formali per la verifica e la sintesi
di sistemi discreti e ibridi".
REFERENCES
[1] T. Ågotnes. 2006. Action and Knowledge in Alternating-time Temporal Logic.
Synthese 149, 2 (2006), 377–409.
[2] T. Ågotnes, V. Goranko, W. Jamroga, and M. Wooldridge. 2015. Knowledge and
Ability. In Handbook of Epistemic Logic, H.P. van Ditmarsch, J.Y. Halpern, W. van
der Hoek, and B.P. Kooi (Eds.). College Publications, 543–589.
[3] T. Ågotnes and D. Walther. 2009. A Logic of Strategic Ability Under Bounded
Memory. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 18, 1 (2009), 55–77.
[4] N. Alechina, M. Dastani, B. Logan, and J.-J. Ch. Meyer. 2007. A Logic of Agent
Programs. In Proceedings of AAAI. 795–800.
[5] N. Alechina, B. Logan, M. Dastani, and J.-J. Ch. Meyer. 2008. Reasoning about
agent execution strategies. In Proceedings of International Joint Conference on
Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS). 1455–1458.
[6] N. Alechina, B. Logan, N.H. Nga, and A. Rakib. 2009. A Logic for Coalitions with
Bounded Resources. In Proceedings of International Joint Conference on Artificial
Intelligence (IJCAI). 659–664.
[7] N. Alechina, B. Logan, H.N. Nguyen, and A. Rakib. 2010. Resource-Bounded
Alternating-Time Temporal Logic. In Proceedings of International Joint Conference
on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS). 481–488.
[8] R. Alur, T.A. Henzinger, and O. Kupferman. 2002. Alternating-Time Temporal
Logic. J. ACM 49, 5 (2002), 672–713.
[9] R. Alur, S. Moarref, and U. Topcu. 2018. Compositional and symbolic synthesis
of reactive controllers for multi-agent systems. Inf. Comput. 261, Part (2018),
616–633.
[10] M. Barlo, G. Carmona, and H. Sabourian. 2008. Bounded memory with finite
action spaces. Sabanci University, Universidade Nova de Lisboa and University of
Cambridge (2008).
[11] F. Belardinelli, A. Lomuscio, and V. Malvone. 2018. Approximating Perfect Recall
When Model Checking Strategic Abilitie. In KR. 435–444.
[12] F. Belardinelli, A. Lomuscio, A. Murano, and S. Rubin. 2017. Verification of Broad-
casting Multi-Agent Systems against an Epistemic Strategy Logic. In Proceedings
of the Twenty-Sixth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI
2017, Melbourne, Australia, August 19-25, 2017. 91–97.
[13] F. Belardinelli, A. Lomuscio, A. Murano, and S. Rubin. 2017. Verification of Multi-
agent Systems with Imperfect Information and Public Actions. In Proceedings of
the 16th Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems, AAMAS 2017,
São Paulo, Brazil, May 8-12, 2017. 1268–1276.
[14] R. Berthon, B. Maubert, and A. Murano. 2017. Decidability Results for ATL* with
Imperfect Information and Perfect Recall. In AAMAS. ACM, 1250–1258.
[15] R. Berthon, B. Maubert, A. Murano, S. Rubin, and M. Y. Vardi. 2017. Strategy
logic with imperfect information. In 32nd Annual ACM/IEEE Symposium on Logic
in Computer Science, LICS 2017, Reykjavik, Iceland, June 20-23, 2017. 1–12.
[16] D. Berwanger and A. B. Mathew. 2017. Infinite games with finite knowledge
gaps. Inf. Comput. 254 (2017), 217–237.
[17] R. Bordini, M. Fisher, W. Visser, and M. Wooldridge. 2006. Verifying Multi-Agent
Programs by Model Checking. Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems 12,
2 (2006), 239–256.
[18] P. Bouyer, N. Markey, and S. Vester. 2017. Nash equilibria in symmetric graph
games with partial observation. Inf. Comput. 254 (2017), 238–258.
[19] N. Bulling and B. Farwer. 2010. Expressing Properties of Resource-Bounded
Systems: The Logics RTL* and RTL. In Proceedings of Computational Logic in
Multi-Agent Systems (CLIMA) (Lecture Notes in Computer Science), Vol. 6214.
22–45.
[20] N. Bulling and B. Farwer. 2010. On the (Un-)Decidability of Model Checking
Resource-Bounded Agents. In Proceedings of ECAI (Frontiers in Artificial Intelli-
gence and Applications), Vol. 215. IOS Press, 567–572.
[21] N. Bulling and W. Jamroga. 2014. Comparing variants of strategic ability: how
uncertainty and memory influence general properties of games. Journal of
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems 28, 3 (2014), 474–518.
[22] S. Busard, C. Pecheur, H. Qu, and F. Raimondi. 2015. Reasoning about memoryless
strategies under partial observability and unconditional fairness constraints. Inf.
Comput. 242 (2015), 128–156.
[23] P. Cermák, A. Lomuscio, F. Mogavero, and A. Murano. 2018. Practical verification
of multi-agent systems against Slk specifications. Inf. Comput. 261, Part (2018),
588–614.
[24] K. Chatterjee, L. Doyen, E. Filiot, and J. F. Raskin. 2017. Doomsday equilibria for
omega-regular games. Inf. Comput. 254 (2017), 296–315.
[25] K. Chatterjee, T.A. Henzinger, and N. Piterman. 2010. Strategy Logic. Information
and Computation 208, 6 (2010), 677–693.
[26] T. Chen, F. Song, and Z. Wu. 2017. Model Checking Pushdown Epistemic Game
Structures. In Formal Methods and Software Engineering - 19th International Con-
ference on Formal Engineering Methods (ICFEM17) (Lecture Notes in Computer
Science), Vol. 10610. Springer, 36–53.
[27] E.M. Clarke and E.A. Emerson. 1981. Design and Synthesis of Synchronization
Skeletons Using Branching Time Temporal Logic. In Proceedings of Logics of
Programs Workshop (Lecture Notes in Computer Science), Vol. 131. 52–71.
[28] M. Dastani and W. Jamroga. 2010. Reasoning about Strategies of Multi-Agent
Programs. In Proceedings of AAMAS. 625–632.
[29] C. Dima and F.L. Tiplea. 2011. Model-checking ATL under Imperfect Information
and Perfect Recall Semantics is Undecidable. Technical Report. arXiv.
[30] H. Duijf and J.M. Broersen. 2016. Representing Strategies. In Proceedings of SR.
15–26. https://doi.org/10.4204/EPTCS.218.2
[31] A. Gupta, S. Schewe, and D. Wojtczak. 2014. Making the best of limited memory
in multi-player discounted sum games. arXiv preprint arXiv:1410.4154 (2014).
[32] J. Gutierrez, G. Perelli, and M. Wooldridge. 2018. Imperfect information in
Reactive Modules games. Inf. Comput. 261, Part (2018), 650–675.
[33] D. Harel and D. Kozen. 1982. Process Logic: Expressiveness, Decidability, Com-
pleteness. J. Comput. System Sci. 25, 2 (1982), 144–170.
[34] A. Herzig, E. Lorini, F. Maffre, and D. Walther. 2014. Alternating-time Temporal
Logic with Explicit Programs. In Proceedings of LAMAS.
[35] J. Hörner andW. Olszewski. 2009. How robust is the Folk Theorem? The Quarterly
Journal of Economics (2009), 1773–1814.
[36] W. Jamroga and T. Ågotnes. 2007. Constructive knowledge: what agents can
achieve under imperfect information. J. Applied Non-Classical Logics 17, 4 (2007),
423–475.
[37] W. Jamroga and J. Dix. 2006. Model Checking ATLir is Indeed ∆P2 -complete. In
Proceedings of EUMAS (CEUR Workshop Proceedings), Vol. 223.
[38] W. Jamroga, M. Knapik, and D. Kurpiewski. 2017. Fixpoint Approximation
of Strategic Abilities under Imperfect Information. In Proceedings of the 16th
International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS).
IFAAMAS, 1241–1249.
[39] W. Jamroga, V. Malvone, and A. Murano. 2017. Reasoning about Natural Strategic
Ability. In Proceedings of the 16th International Conference on Autonomous Agents
and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS). IFAAMAS, 714–722.
[40] W. Jamroga and A. Murano. 2015. Module Checking of Strategic Ability. In Pro-
ceedings of the 14th International Conference on Autonomous Agents andMultiagent
Systems AAMAS 2015. IFAAMAS, 227–235.
[41] W. Jamroga and W. van der Hoek. 2004. Agents that Know how to Play. Funda-
menta Informaticae 63, 2–3 (2004), 185–219.
[42] O. Kupferman and M. Y. Vardi. 1997. Module checking revisited. In CAV’97.
Springer, 36–47.
[43] O. Kupferman and M. Y. Vardi. 2000. Synthesis with incomplete informatio. In
Advances in Temporal Logic. Springer, 109–127.
[44] V. Malvone, A. Murano, and L. Sorrentino. 2017. Hiding Actions in Multi-Player
Games. In AAMAS. 1205–1213.
[45] V. Malvone, A. Murano, and L. Sorrentino. 2018. Additional Winning Strategies
in Reachability Games. Fundam. Inform. 159, 1-2 (2018), 175–195.
[46] B. Maubert and A. Murano. 2018. Reasoning about Knowledge and Strategies
under Hierarchical Information. In KR. AAAI Press, 530–540.
[47] F. Mogavero, A. Murano, G. Perelli, and M.Y. Vardi. 2014. Reasoning About
Strategies: On the Model-Checking Problem. ACM Transactions on Computational
Logic 15, 4 (2014), 1–42.
[48] F. Mogavero, A. Murano, G. Perelli, and M.Y. Vardi. 2017. Reasoning about
Strategies: on the Satisfiability Problem. Logical Methods in Computer Science 13,
1 (2017). https://doi.org/10.23638/LMCS-13(1:9)2017
[49] P. Novák and W. Jamroga. 2009. Code Patterns for Agent Oriented Programming.
In Proceedings of AAMAS’09. 105–112.
[50] A. Pnueli and R. Rosner. 1989. On the Synthesis of a Reactive Module.. In POPL’89.
Association for Computing Machinery, 179–190.
[51] A. Pnueli and R. Rosner. 1990. Distributed reactive systems are hard to synthesize.
In FOCS. 746–757.
[52] J. H. Reif. 1984. The Complexity of Two-Player Games of Incomplete Information.
J. Comput. Syst. Sci. 29, 2 (1984), 274–301.
[53] P. Y. Schobbens. 2004. Alternating-Time Logic with Imperfect Recall. Electronic
Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 85, 2 (2004), 82–93.
[54] W. van der Hoek, W. Jamroga, and M. Wooldridge. 2005. A Logic for Strategic
Reasoning. In Proceedings of AAMAS’05. 157–164.
[55] S. Vester. 2013. Alternating-time temporal logic with finite-memory strategies.
In GandALF 2013. 194–207.
[56] D. Walther, W. van der Hoek, and M. Wooldridge. 2007. Alternating-time Tempo-
ral Logic with Explicit Strategies. In Proceedings TARK XI. Presses Universitaires
de Louvain, 269–278.
[57] N. Yadav and S. Sardiña. 2012. Reasoning about Agent Programs Using ATL-Like
Logics. In Proceedings of JELIA. 437–449.
